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6.1  Introduction 
6.1.1  Why Evaluate Medical Experiments? 
Although the life expectancy of the U.S. population seems finally to be 
lengthening, after a prolonged period during which not much improve- 
ment was seen (U.S. Department of  Health and Human Services 1980), 
the nation has been increasingly concerned about costs of  health care 
(Fuchs 1974; Hiatt 1975). One possible response to this concern is an 
accelerated strategy for evaluating the efficacy of medical practices, with 
the hope that identifying those practices that are not efficacious will lead 
to their abandonment and, therefore, to substantial savings in health care 
resources (Cochrane 1972). Undeniably, some medical practices, though 
costly, may not be efficacious; others may never have had their efficacy 
evaluated. Often-cited examples are tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy- 
procedures whose appropriateness has raised doubts for decades, yet 
only recently has rigorous evaluation of their benefits begun. The Office 
of Technology Assessment reviewed a substantial number of diagnostic, 
preventive, and therapeutic practices in several areas of  medicine and 
found that few had been adequately evaluated (U.S.  Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment 1978). 
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An alternative response to the cost problem acknowledges that in- 
formation on efficacy will  not  eliminate the need to face trade-offs 
between increasing incremental costs and diminishing incremental ben- 
efits. Given what we know about the benefits offered by available medical 
technologies, we expect a continuum from more cost-effective to less 
cost-effective; the more we are willing to spend, the more health we can 
purchase albeit at increasing incremental costs per unit of benefit. If we 
want to control costs without sacrificing health benefits, then we must 
learn how to assess the cost-effectiveness of  medical practices and use this 
information to help us substitute more for less cost-effective practices. 
Examples of  technologies  for which proof  of  efficacy may not be the 
central issue,  but  for which cost-effectiveness is, include heart trans- 
plants, intensive care for the terminally ill, and possibly artificial implant- 
able organs in the future. Moreover, information on efficacy will  not 
resolve the highly individual and subjective judgments about the value of 
symptom relief or other aspects of  improved quality of  life. 
These two responses  to the health-cost  problem  are not  mutually 
exclusive, although they lead to different emphases. While we concen- 
trate on evaluation of efficacy as one approach to improving the public 
health and/or controlling costs, we acknowledge-and,  indeed, seek to 
elucidate-some  of the limitations of evaluation of efficacy in the health 
care system. 
Evaluation has its own costs, and so we need to consider how much 
different kinds of  evaluation are worth and what their benefits may be. 
The long-run  goal of  the research that we  outline here would be to 
develop and demonstrate a methodology for assessing these benefits and 
costs. 
To oversimplify for a moment, we can identify two possible scenarios 
that result from evaluating efficacy. In the first, a therapy or diagnostic 
method that proved ineffective (or, at least, cost-ineffective) would be 
dropped by  the profession,  and the money  saved  would  reduce  the 
national medical budget without substantially impairing health. In the 
second scenario, a procedure is proved effective, leading to more wide- 
spread use and the resultant health benefits. We have examples of  both 
scenarios:  gastric freezing, for the first,  and antihypertensive medica- 
tions, for the second. We return to these examples below. 
Students of policy will recognize both of these scenarios as idealized 
and unrealistic. Technological changes and changes in practice are ordi- 
narily slow, except in crisis situations. For the first scenario, funds not 
used for one purpose are quickly and smoothly diverted to other uses, 
possibly ones that compensate for an abandoned procedure. Advocates 
of a procedure let go slowly and use ostensibly (and sometimes legiti- 
mate) scientific arguments  to cast doubt on the validity of the evaluation. 
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dures, even if  proven efficacious, unless they perceive the benefits to be 
immediate and attributable to the intervention  (a general obstacle to 
adopting preventive medical practices). 
While we may doubt instant abandonment of  procedures, immediate 
reduction in expenditures, or universal adoption of newly validated prac- 
tices, we can hope that identifying better procedures will improve the use 
of  medical resources. Improvement may be accomplished by increasing 
the use of underutilized or innovative practices or programs, by finding 
more cost-effective or less risky ways to administer care, by weeding out 
useless or harmful procedures, or merely by speeding up the process that 
grades procedures as better or worse. 
Studies of the effectiveness of evaluations or of the diffusion of medical 
technology make clear that attempts to evaluate evaluations have a rocky 
road. For example, the innovation of gastric freezing for treating gastric 
ulcers was  abandoned  after substantial evaluations (Miao 1977), but 
perhaps the procedure was already out of style before the strongest trial 
had been completed (Fineberg 1976). If  the latter was the case, then 
weaker studies may have had a substantial effect on the total process of 
introduction, use, and abandonment. At the same time, we know that 
some techniques such as bleeding, now believed to have no merit, lin- 
gered for centuries without evaluation. Consequently, we can afford to 
approach with modesty a study that aims to develop a basis for evaluating 
the benefits, risks, and costs of various methods of  appraising effective- 
ness. It is not that we feel the effort unimportant, but that the path has 
new thickets that replace the old ones as fast as they are cleared. 
Although we recognize the difficulty of  the task, we are reminded of 
the need for some rational basis for allocating resources to clinical experi- 
ments.  Budgets for clinical trials at the National Institutes of  Health 
(NIH) are under constant surveillance, and vigilant congressmen will 
want to know that the resources have been well spent. Administrators of 
these agencies, facing contracting budgets, must constantly decide in 
what medical procedures to invest resources for a clinical trial, recogniz- 
ing that a trial done in one area means a trial not done in another. Can 
these administrators not only improve their decision rules for internal- 
budget allocation, but also determine whether additional resources spent 
on clinical investigations have a greater expected return than resources 
spent at the margin elsewhere in the health sector? The economist’s test 
of  allocative efficiency (equal shadow prices across and within sectors of 
the budget) has more than a little conceptual appeal in this domain, but 
the analytical tasks are formidable. 
We  realize  that  the conceptual  tools needed  for  such studies will 
require repeated refinement. Our first few efforts have no hope of being 
definitive. From our work thus far, we believe that we cannot get useful 
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We find the candidates extremely varied in their form and background 
information.  Therefore  it  may  be  valuable to outline our beginning 
thoughts and what we foresee as difficulties,  in anticipation that criticism 
will help us streamline and direct a long-term effort or that, informed by 
the evaluations of our peers, we may even be encouraged to abandon it. 
6.1.2  Methods of  Evaluation 
Initially we defined the problem as that of evaluating the randomized 
clinical trial (RCT). What is it worth to evaluate a new procedure using 
RCT?  Inevitably the  question  arises,  “Compared  with  what?”  One 
answer is, “Compared to what would have happened in the absence of an 
RCT.” The possible procedures  for comparison are varied:  perhaps 
observational  studies of  procedures  after  they  are widely practiced, 
perhaps clinic-based or community-based studies, perhaps systematic 
efforts using data banks, perhaps NIH consensus-development confer- 
ences, perhaps committee appraisals in the Institute of  Medicine or the 
Assembly of  the Life Sciences of  the National Research  Council, or 
perhaps the review papers in such professional journals as the British 
Medical Journal, Journal of  the American Medical Association, Lancet, 
the New England Journal of  Medicine, or those devoted to specialties. 
Whatever the alternatives may be, we do not seem to be able to deal with 
the RCT, or other methods, in isolation. Obviously this necessity for 
breadth multiplies our research effort enormously. 
Moreover, we need to design the potential study (RCT or otherwise) 
before evaluating it. (The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute uses 
a planning phase when it prospectively evaluates its clinical trials in which 
the basic structure of  the experimental design is formulated prior to a 
decision to proceed with full-scale design and implementation [Levy and 
Sondik 19781.) Since this planning step is also necessary in developing 
railroads and buildings and weapons systems, we seem to be stuck with it. 
Usually we hope that the costs of processing information leading up to 
a decision, a sort of  transaction cost, will  be negligible relative to the 
value of  the decision, but if  heavy detail is required, such a simplication 
may be mistaken. 
Some general qualitative or operating principles might be developed. 
For example, we could set up an operating principle that a study involving 
more than a million people to be followed for twenty years is hopeless. 
Or, given a choice, that acute-disease studies pay off better than chronic- 
disease studies, or vice versa. We are not endorsing these as principles, 
but as illustrations of policies that could emerge from a historical study of 
medical experiments. 
We know that sometimes an RCT  is impractical; other times it may not 
be helpful because other considerations, including value judgments, may 
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vaccine against paralytic polio. Today the Salk vaccine (killed virus) is 
widely used abroad, while Sabin vaccine (live virus) is largely used in the 
United States. Both vaccines seem to be highly effective, though it is said 
that the Sabin leads to a few cases of polio in those exposed to recently 
vaccinated people (Institute of Medicine 1977). The decision as to which 
to use seems to depend more on an analysis of the policy of enforcement 
of  administration than on efficacy. A major reason for Sabin use in the 
United States seems to be our perceived inability to administer booster 
shots. At another level, some public health officials are considering trying 
to wipe out the virus totally by administering both Salk and Sabin vac- 
cines to all children  (“This Week  in  Review,”  New  York Times, 25 
January 1981). To consider and evaluate this idea would require evalua- 
tion methods different from the RCT. We will need to consider how to 
choose methods of  evaluation for various purposes, taking into account 
the value of  information produced on the acceptability, risk, cost, and 
effectiveness of  the proposed procedures. 
6.1.3  How Are Evaluations Used? 
The value of  an evaluation depends on how its results are translated 
into changes in practice. Our approach considers three classes of  deci- 
sion-making models in the presence of information from evaluations: the 
normative, the descriptive, and the regulatory. 
In the normative model-the  ideal-physicians  act in the best interests 
of  society. They process new information rationally. They allocate re- 
sources according to the principles of cost-effectiveness  analysis, electing 
the procedures that yield the maximum health benefits obtainable from 
the health care budget. Although some future reconfiguration of incen- 
tives in our health care system (e.g., explicit resource ceilings, increased 
competition, increased central management) may move us closer to that 
state of affairs, the normative model of decision making is best thought of 
as an unattainable ideal; the value of information under this model is the 
best we can possibly expect. 
In the descriptive model, or models, we would attempt to assess what 
the response of  physicians and other decision makers would be to the 
information from a trial. Here we must rely on past experiences and on 
what economic, sociologic, and psychologic theories tell us. We need to 
learn how to predict when the response will be rapid, when slow, when 
nonexistent, and when paradoxical. Perhaps a model can be developed, 
based on data from past history, that would identify the characteristics of 
the procedure, the type of study (e.g., randomized versus observational, 
large versus small, multi-center versus single institution), the nature of 
the medical specialty, and other variables that can be combined into a 
prediction of  response. 
In the regulatory model, we would allow for the possibility of interven- 226  Frederick Mosteller/Milton C. Weinstein 
tion (by government, by insurers, by professional societies) intended to 
make medical practice more responsive to information. For example, 
reimbursement might be preconditioned on evidence of efficacy or other- 
wise linked to the state of  information. FDA-type procedures for prac- 
tices other than drugs and devices would fall into this category. We 
recognize many problems inherent in such an approach:  establishing 
criteria for efficacy where outcomes are multi-attributed (including sur- 
vival and many features of  the quality of  life), establishing criteria for 
efficacy to apply to a heterogeneous population  when the procedure 
cannot have been tested in all possible subpopulations. We realize that 
more decentralized approaches to altering incentives for practice in re- 
sponse to information on efficacy-or even to collecting the information 
itself-may  be possible. 
6.1.4  Our Objective 
We propose, in section 6.2, a general conceptual model for evaluating 
the cost-effectiveness of clinical trials. This rather formal, oversimplified 
model will need more specificity when applied. It likely omits important 
policy or technological features, either because we have not thought of 
them or because modeling them presents frustrations. 
In section 6.3 we discuss the range of medical problems that might be 
examined and the range of evaluative options that need to be compared. 
Our major aim in this section, however, is to describe the kinds of data 
that may be needed in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a trial. These 
data requirements follow from the conceptual model in section 6.2 and 
from the realities that emerge when some of the simplifying assumptions 
are relaxed. For example, how do the results of  the trial link to medical 
practice? Who are the decision makers, how will they use the data, and 
where does the burden of  proof lie? We consider also the basis for the 
required probability assessments, the outcome measures that enter into 
the definition of  “effectiveness,” and the costs and risks of  the clinical 
studies themselves. In section 6.4, we turn to some illustrative examples, 
sketched briefly to make more realistic some of  the issues discussed. 
These sketches should not be confused with what a full study would 
require. Furthermore, we would presumably need collections of studies 
to help us base the models on empirical results. 
Finally, in section 6.5 we discuss some of the kinds of studies that we 
believe are ultimately required to make this program a reality. 
6.2  A Simplified Decision-Analytic Model for 
Assessing the Cost-Effectiveness  of a Trial 
6.2.1  Rationale 
Let us clarify our thinking by  beginning with a grossly oversimplified 
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simplified model and then relaxing the assumptions, we can identify the 
data requirements for actually carrying out a program of  evaluating the 
cost-effectiveness of  a clinical trial. 
We should point  out that  ours is not  the first attempt at applying 
decision-analytic concepts to the  problem  of  evaluating evaluations. 
Thompson,  for  example,  developed  a  model  for  evaluating  social- 
program evaluations and applied it to an evaluation of  a U.S.-supported 
health program in Yugoslavia (Thompson 1975). The author admittedly 
found it difficult  to apply the model quantitatively, but did derive qualita- 
tive conclusions about the administrative and bureaucratic determinants 
of effective evaluation. Stafford developed a similar model in relation to 
evaluations of  manpower training programs (Stafford 1979). In the do- 
main of clinical trials, Levy and Sondik (1978) have presented a concep- 
tual framework for allocating resources in the National Heart, Lung, and 
Blood Institute, but their approach stops short of  a formal assessment of 
the expected  value  of  information.  We want  to assess the  value  of 
information and the costs, risks, and benefits of obtaining it in a practical, 
but still quantitative manner. 
6.2.2  The Cost-Effectiveness Model of 
Health Care Resource Allocation 
Economists turn to cost-effectiveness analysis when resources are lim- 
ited and when the objective is to maximize some nonmonetary output. 
This technique is well suited to the assessment of  medical procedures, 
where outcomes do not lend themselves to monetary valuation.  The 
cost-effectiveness  of a medical procedure may be evaluated as the ratio of 
its resource cost (in dollars) to some measure of its health effectiveness 
(Weinstein  and  Stason  1977; U.S.  Congress,  Office  of  Technology 
Assessment  1980). The units of  effectiveness vary across studies, but 
years-of-life gained is the most commonly used. The rationale for using 
such a ratio as a basis for resource allocation is as follows. Let us suppose 
that the health care budget is B. (In the United States in  1980, B was 
about  $200  billion  per  year.)  Let  us  further  suppose  that  cost- 
effectiveness analyses have been performed on each of  the N  possible 
uses of  health care resources, perhaps defined by  procedure and target 
population. (Of course, N is a very large number.) Suppose the expected 
net-resource burden of procedure i is Ci  ,  and its expected net effective- 
ness is Ei  .  Consider only procedures for which Ci  and Ej  are both positive, 
(since the optimal decision rule for procedures with one positive and the 
other negative is obvious, and because doing a procedure with negative Ci 
and Ei  is equivalent to not doing one with positive, but equal, absolute 
values). Finally, assume that society’s objective is to allocate the budget 
to achieve the  maximum  total  health  effect  (setting aside, for  later 
reexamination, equity concerns). In other words, consider total effective- 
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regardless of  who benefits. Then the problem reduces to the program- 
ming problem 
N 
max  Z  6; Ei, 
{a;}  i= 1 
subject to the usual constraints 
N 
i= 1  c  6i C,sB,  056j51, 
the solution to which is to select procedures in increasing order of  the 
ratios CiIEi  until the budget B is exhausted. The CIE  ratio for the “last” 
procedure chosen;h ,  is the reciprocal of the shadow price on the budget 
constraint; that shadow price,  in turn, may  be interpreted as the in- 
cremental health value (in years of  life, say, or quality-adjusted years of 
life) per additional dollar allocated to health care. 
Although the cost-effectiveness model is  far from being used as a 
blueprint for health resource allocation in practice, many studies along 
these lines have helped clarify the relative efficiency with which health 
care resources are being, or might be, consumed in various areas of 
medical technology (U.S. Congress, Office of  Technology Assessment 
1980;  Bunker, Barnes, and Mosteller 1977;  Weinstein and Stason 1976). 
6.2.3  A Cost-Effectiveness Model for Clinical Trials 
In the above formulation, the net costs (CJ  and net effectiveness (EJ 
are uncertain. For purposes of today’s decision making, it may be reason- 
able to act on their expected values, but we must not obscure the possibil- 
ity that new information might alter our perceptions of these variables (in 
the Bayesian sense of  prior-to-posterior revision), thus permitting real- 
locations of  the budget in more health-producing ways. In terms of  this 
same objective function, it is reasonable  to ask what is the value of 
information about the effectiveness of  a medical procedure. Moreover, 
since resources for providing such information (e.g., for clinical trials) are 
limited, it is reasonable to ask what is the cost-effectiveness of  a clinical 
trial, where the “cost” would be the resource cost of  the trial and the 
“effectiveness” would be the expected increase in the health benefits 
produced, owing to the information. We would also want to take into 
account the possibility that, if  the utilization of  a procedure drops as a 
consequence of  the trial (e.g. ,  if  the procedure is found not to be effec- 
tive), the result might be a freeing up of  health care resources for other 
beneficial purposes. 
6.2.4  A Simple Model of  Two Treatments 
We are wary of constructing an elaborate model that is too restrictive in 
some fundamental way, so we think it best to start with a simple formal 
model that can be made more realistic as we gain insights from studying 229  Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness  of  Medical and Social Experiments 
specific examples. For illustrative purposes, this simplified model rests on 
a strong normative assumption of behavior in response to the information 
from a trial. If  the model were correct, it would yield an upper bound on 
the value of  a trial. More realistic estimates might derive from a model 
based on predictions of  actual decision making in the presence of  trial 
data. Such a model with  descriptive assumptions could also be  con- 
structed. 











An old treatment has been used for some time. It has two possible 
outcomes: success and failure. 
A new treatment, about whose efficacy little is known (except from 
laboratory studies), also may result in either success or failure. 
Both treatments (a) tend to be used on repeated occasions in indi- 
vidual patients, and (b) make their effects known rather quickly; 
moreover, (c) we can distinguish “success” from “failure .” 
Let Po and PN be the probabilities of  success for the old and new 
treatments, respectively. We start with  a joint prior with density 
f(Po,PN).  The marginal means are r0  and rN. 
The probabilities of success apply to all patients uniformly. This fact 
is known and unalterable. (This assumption implies that there would 
be no advantage to stratification.) 
A controlled  experiment  with  sufficiently large sample sizes can 
compare the two treatments in such a way that it can be assumed to 
provide virtually perfect information on Po and PN. 
In the absence of  the experiment, the old treatment will continue to 
be used for T years, in X,  patients in the tth year (t = 1, . . . ,  T);  the 
experiment lasts TE  years (TE  < T).  T is known. 
The unit costs of the treatments are known to be Co and CN,  for the 
old and new, respectively. 
With the experiment, the new treatment will be adopted if and only if 
its adoption is “cost-effective” in the sense defined in assumption 10 
below. Its adoption will  be universal, and it will replace the old 
treatment up to the horizon at year T.  (This is the normative assump- 
tion of  decision making.) 
The new treatment will be considered cost effective if  and only if 
PN> Po or ‘O-  ‘,>AV, 
-  PN 
where V is the health benefit per “success” achieved (in years, or 
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this case health care resources are effectively unlimited,  and the 
shadow price on the budget constraint [1/A] is zero.) 
11. The cost of  the experiment is CE;  there are no risks. 
12. All decision makers are risk neutral. 
Consider first the case in which the new treatment is at least as costly as 
the old (CN 1  Co).  In that case, the trial has value only if  it results in a 





(CN -  Co)/V(PN -  Po)  <A. 
= {(pO?pN):  (PN -  pO)>(cN -  CO)/VA)  > 
T  x=  x  Xt(1+r)-t, 
t’tE 
where r is the discount rate. Then the expected health benefit from the 
experiment equals 
vx[ss(pN -  PO)f (PO,PN)dPOdPN]  * 
n 
Note that we are discounting health benefits at the same rate as costs 
(Weinstein and Stason 1977). The costs consist of  two components: the 
expected induced treatment cost if  the new treatment is adopted, which 
equals 
x(cN  -  cO)$$f  (PO,PN)dPOdPN, 
n 
and the cost of  the trial, which equals C, . 
expected costs to expected benefits: 
Cost-effectiveness = 
One measure of cost-effectiveness would be given by the ratio of total 
CE/X  + (CN  -  Co)  SSf  (Po,  PN)~Po~PN 
n 
vJJ(pN  -  PO)f (PO,PN)dPOdPN 
R 
Now consider the case where the new treatment is less costly than the old 
(CN  < Co) . In that case, the value of  experiment might consist of  the 
potential cost savings if  the finding is that the new treatment is no less 
effective than the old. 
Then the expected savings consist of 231  Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness of  Medical and Social Experiments 
and the expected health benefits would consist of 
= vss  (pN -  P0)f  (PO,PN)dPOdPN. 
Q 
If  the expected savings exceed C,,  then the experiment is clearly cost- 
effective; if  not, then a measure of  its cost-effectiveness would be given 
If  we apply the cost-effectiveness model rigorously in this latter case, 
the new treatment might be found to be less effective than the old, but not 
so much less that it would not be cost-effective  to adopt it anyway, taking 
into account its lower cost. This might happen if  PN < Po, but 
by  (C, -  S)/B. 
‘OCN  >A. 
v(pO -  pN) 
Thus, the effect of  the experiment might be to make health outcomes a 
little worse, but in a cost-effective way when compared to other uses of 
resources. This situation is analogous to one in which an experiment, 
while proving no benefit, at least gives us reasonable assurance that the 
procedure in question is cost-ineffective compared to other available 
health interventions. 
We  do  not  want  to  attach  too  much  importance  to  the  cost- 
effectiveness ratios themselves. Their meaning depends on a rather styl- 
ized and fanciful notion of how decisions get made and how resources are 
constrained. Rather, we do want to emphasize the approach to estimat- 
ing, for a trial, the expected change in health outcomes and the expected 
induced health care costs or cost savings. 
6.2.5  Relaxing the Assumptions 
Now, let us return to reality and see how, by relaxing the assumptions, 
we  can identify the data required  for the kind of  evaluation we  are 
proposing. 





How will decisions be made once the information from the trial is in 
hand? How does this depend on the design and conduct of the trial? 
How does it depend on the health care institutional structure (e.g., 
regulation, financing)? 
How would decisions have been made without the trial? What would 
have been the course of diffusion and adoption of  the procedure? 
How can the system be improved, by regulation or by imposing more 
appropriate incentives, so that the results of trials will be used more 
effectively and efficiently? 
What do we do if  the measure of  efficacy is more complicated than 
“cure”? How do we handle risks, side effects, symptoms? At the very 









also  want  to allow for  the possibility  that the trial  will  provide 
information on them. How do  we handle effects on morbidity and the 
quality of  life? 
How do we  handle  a nonhomogeneous  population  in  which  the 
comparative efficacy (and risks, and perhaps costs) may differ among 
subsets of  the population? Do we need to evaluate alternative ex- 
perimental designs? 
How do we assess the information from a trial that does not give 
perfect information? 
How do we assess the information we would get from nonexperi- 
mental designs? 
How do we establish the time horizon for the procedures in question, 
and how do we estimate the numbers of patients who would receive 
them? How should we decide when in the course of a procedure’s 
dissemination to do a trial? 
How do we assess prior probabilities  of  efficacy (i.e., prior to the 
decision to do the trial)? 
How do we assess the costs and risks of  the experiments themselves? 
What are some of  the other, less direct, benefits of doing trials? 
Problems in Assessing Cost-Effectiveness 
of Medical Evaluations 
In the enterprise we are suggesting, we would hope to have the aid of 
physicians as well as economists in bring additional realism to the evalua- 
tions. The tendency in medical studies, as in judicial review, is to avoid 
generalizations and focus strongly on specifics. As the following discus- 
sion illustrates, the diversity and incomparability  of  situations forces 
these  constraints.  Diagnosis,  prevention,  therapies,  palliation,  and 
health care delivery all fall within the scope of the studies we might try to 
evaluate. RCT’s can be used for any of them or may be a component of 
evaluation.  For example, in  considering  the dissemination  of  a  new 
expensive technology, we may  require an RCT to help measure  the 
effectiveness of treatment as one component of an evaluation. Another 
component might relate to utilization patterns, and yet another to costs. 
We will probably focus on  the RCT  as a method of providing information 
on efficacy and take information on other aspects of cost-effectiveness as 
given. However, we may also want to consider how to  assess the value of 
information on costs or on patterns of  use of medical procedures and 
facilities. 
6.3.1 
In section 6.2, we offered a stylized model  in  which resources  are 
allocated  “rationally,”  as if  by  a benevolent  Bayesian  dictator. This 
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model may be helpful to get us started, but it needs to be brought back to 
reality. 
An alternative to the “rational” model is a model that captures the way 
procedures actually are adopted or abandoned. We do not know very 
much about how decisions are actually made. When a therapy is evalu- 
ated and found useful (or useless or damaging), what can we say of  the 
events that follow? Recent research on the diffusion of medical practices 
sheds some light on this question (Barnes 1977; Mia0 1977; Fineberg 
1976), but, as noted earlier, the conclusions regarding the effect of  the 
trial  itself are often ambiguous. When the experiment  on mammary 
artery ligation for relief of  angina showed the sham operation to be as 
good as the experimental one (Barsamian 1977), we understand that the 
experimental operation was dropped. When studies showed that succes- 
sive diagnoses of  the need for tonsillectomy in groups previously di- 
agnosed as not diseased produced the same proportion of  “diseased” 
diagnoses as in the full group, as far as we can see nothing happened 
(Bakwin 1945). 
We need a systematic set of historical studies that tells us the situation 
before, during, and after the evaluations. (We say evaluations because 
often more than one is available.) From these, it might be possible to 
identify the factors that tend to predict the impact of  evaluations on 
practice. For example, how does the effect of an RCT on practice depend 
on the existence of  an inventory of prior observational studies? Does it 
matter whether the RCT contradicts or confirms the previous studies? 
Does the second or third RCT make more of a difference than the first? 
Perhaps, as Cochrane (1972) suggested, we should systematically plan 
more than one trial, not just for scientific reasons, but because people will 
pay attention to the results. 
Related to the hypothesis about multiple trials is the question of  the 
importance of packaging and public relations for trials. Perhaps trials that 
show a dramatic effect (or that refute a generally believed large effect) 
more successfully affect practice than those that deal in small effects. 
Taking this into account, assuming it is true, should we give priority to 
trials that are believed ex ante, to be more likely to make a big splash, 
even if this strategy means sacrificing cost-effectiveness  as defined by our 
hypernormative model? 
We may also want to consider the value of making certain that a trial 
seems relevant  to a physician’s practice,  e.g., by  conducting it  in  a 
community setting, by using a seemingly “typical” cross section of  pa- 
tients. The probability of a successful result may have to be reduced in 
order to increase the probability of disseminating the findings in practice. 
Finally, we observe that with the descriptive, rather than normative, 
view of decision making, it is very possible that a trial might have negative 
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efficacious might be widely adopted even if  they are not cost-effective. 
Procedures often are used in clinical circumstances beyond those for 
which they were evaluated. Efficacy in the hands of  experts may not 
translate into effectiveness in the hands of  a nonexpert, especially com- 
plex surgical or diagnostic techniques. Promoting a procedure of  ques- 
tionable efficacy to the status of  a trial might give it credibility that it 
would otherwise lack if  left to the “quacks.” These and other concerns 
should be weighed against the benefits of trials, because the medical care 
system does not always use information, even good information, just as 
we would want it to. 
6.3.2  How Decisions Will Be Made Based 
on the Literature and Record 
Suppose we look at the observational study model when an innovation 
comes into society, is practiced (or experimented on) for a while, and 
reports appear about it. How do clinical practitioners respond to these 
reports and fragments of information? We can draw upon the literature 
for theoretical insights, but the empirical data base is thin. We see no way 
to handle this lack of data except to obtain a collection of situations, try to 
trace them as cases, and then to generalize to some models. For example, 
by systematically reviewing a surgical journal through the years, Barnes 
(1977) has provided examples of  surgical innovations that later were 
discarded. 
6.3.3  How to Design Institutions to Improve Incentives 
to Use Information Appropriately 
Our third model of the response of  health care providers to informa- 
tion from trials (the first two being the normative model and the descrip- 
tive model) would allow for intervention, or at least changes in  the 
incentives for decision making owing to changes in the structure of health 
care insitutions. Regulation is one form of  intervention. Weinstein and 
Sherman  (1980)  developed  a  structured  framework  for  considering 
alternative regulatory and nonregulatory ‘‘levers’’ upon the health care 
system, taking into account the target of  intervention (provider, patient, 
etc.), the nature of  the lever (strict regulation, incentive, persuasion, 
etc.), and a variety of  other dimensions. Our purpose here is not to 
enumerate all possible forms of leverage, but rather to mention a few as 
examples. 
Various agencies at various levels have some leverage on practice, 
ranging from regulators such as the FDA to reimbursers such as the 
Health  Care Financing Administration  (HCFA) or Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield. Both HCFA and the Blues have ceased payment for some proce- 
dures found to be inefficacious. The National Center for Health Care 
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bursed on grounds of  cost-effectiveness, although the recommendation 
was modified to permit certain providers to obtain reimbursement. 
Direct  linkage  of  reimbursement  to demonstrated  efficacy, while 
appealing in principle, has several limitations. Among these are problems 
in making the leap from efficacy in a study population to efficacy in 
individual patients. There would always be the need for some sort of 
escape clause in exceptional cases. Another problem in such a centralized 
approach is how to determine to what degree subjectively held concerns 
for symptoms and the quality of life are legitimate components of efficacy 
and, if they are, how to weigh them into the standard for reimbursement. 
Furthermore, fiscal intermediaries seem not to have much of an incentive 
to engage in such regulatory practices. 
Another intervention that seems to work, at least in some settings, 
involves systematic persuasion within professional societies and peer 
groups.  In one experience, physicians in  one hospital reduced  their 
utilization of tonsillectomy when told of  their excessive rates relative to 
other hospitals (Wennberg et al. 1977; Dyck et al. 1977; Lembcke 1959). 
The Professional Standards Review Organization program was to have 
had this model as its raison d’stre, although it is not clear how successful it 
has been. 
At present we do not have a stable, but a rapidly changing system of 
control. Thus information, reimbursement principles, and changing reg- 
ulations may be heavily confounded so that our ability to model a rational 
or  irrational process may be heavily compromised. On the other hand, we 
may be able to gain insights into the kinds of institutional structures that 
are well suited to use information provided by  clinical trials. 
6.3.4  How Shall We Characterize Measures of  Efficacy 
Required for Clinical Decision Making? 
Acute  and chronic diseases tend  to give  us  different measures  of 
outcome. In acute disease we usually focus on proportion surviving or 
proportion cured or degree of cure rather than length of  survival. Mor- 
bidity, measured perhaps by days in the hospital, gives another measure 
of efficacy. Ideally we would compare costs, risks, and benefits from the 
new treatment with those from the standard treatment. 
In chronic disease, we may be especially concerned with length of 
survival and with quality of  life. Although it is generally agreed that 
quality of life is important, indeed often the dominant issue, its measure- 
ment, evaluation, and integration into cost-benefit studies must still be 
regarded as experimental (Weinstein 1979). Studies are proceeding in 
various places.  For example, at Beth  Israel  Hospital, John  Hedley- 
Whyte, M.D., and Allen Lisbon, M.D., are pilot testing a questionnaire 
on quality of  life following surgery. Although the patient reports on the 
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etc.), a summary that could be integrated with other attributes of  out- 
come is not in sight. Instead, comparisons of results for different opera- 
tions is readily available. For another example, in a body of  research 
dealing with “health-status indexes,” subjects assign weights to various 
health states, and a single measure of “weighted life expectancy” or 
“quality-adjusted life expectancy” is derived (Torrance 1976; Kaplan, 
Bush,  and Berry  1976). Applications of  these  techniques  to  specific 
procedures, using real subjects, are rare. 
Another problem arises especially in the evaluation of  diagnostic pro- 
cedures. If  a new method of  diagnosis successfully detects cases of  a 
disease for which we have no effective treatment, how valuable is the 
technology? It may be useful for counselling or for research, but the 
effect on health outcome may be negligible. 
6.3.5  Problems with Heterogeneous Populations 
Information on homogeneity of response to treatment across patients 
and providers tells about the uncertainty of  improvements a therapy 
offers. If  community hospitals get different results from teaching hospi- 
tals, or if  various ethnic, age, or sex groups produce differing responses, 
then efficacy becomes difficult to measure. In these circumstances, we 
have difficulty nailing down the amount of  gain owing to new informa- 
tion. 
The  problems are especially severe when we must deal with groups that 
have no theoretical connections among them. Let us  mention first a 
favorable situation. In dose-response-curve work, we often have rough 
theory and experience to guide the choice of a relation. Since differences 
in shape of the relation may have modest impact, we can use the informa- 
tion from several groups, and then, say, weight the groups to estimate the 
effect; we do not lose much information by  spreading the information 
across the groups. But when groups may not be related in their response, 
the total size of  the investigation must be increased. In the extreme case, 
when we cannot argue from one group to another, each group must be 
considered separately: pre- versus postmenopausal women, men at var- 
ious ages and in various stages of  diseases, The total sample size for the 
study would equal the sum of the sample sizes for each group. As groups 
proliferate, samples become small, too small to determine anything for 
each group separately. The typical situation lies between these extremes, 
and we need to learn more about how to model them. 
The central point here is that a trial may be valuable in telling us who 
can benefit from a procedure and who cannot. Such information could 
save lots of  money,  even if  most procedures  are beneficial for some 
people. But learning how to describe the subpopulations that can benefit 
may not be easy, especially if  we do not have a good predictive model 
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6.3.6  Assessing the Informational Content of 
Alternative Experimental Designs 
The precision of  outcome achievable by various designs depends on 
their size, on their stratification, and on the uniformity of  individual and 
group response.  In  addition,  the  measurement  technique  sets  some 
bounds on precision because simple yes-no responses may not be  as 
sensitive as those achieved by  relevant measured variables. When the 
outcome variables measured are not the relevant ones but proxies for 
them, we lose both precision and validity. 
The RCT, however, is likely to give us values for a rather narrow 
setting and would need to be buttressed by  further information from 
before and after the investigation. 
6.3.7  Assessing the Informational Content 
of  Nonexperimental Designs 
Nonexperimental designs run the gamut from anecdotes or case studies 
of  single individuals through observational studies. 
Current behaviors toward such studies have great variety; prevailing 
attitudes include ignoring them, regarding them as stimuli for designing 
studies with better controls, and regarding them as true, even overriding 
contradictory results from better-controlled studies. Although it is easy 
to list reasons often given for these differing behaviors of  people and 
institutions, (reasons such as: physicians like the medical theory; institu- 
tions like the implied reimbursement policy; no one has a better therapy, 
and patients need something; a new generation of  physicians is required 
to understand the new biological theory; patients won’t comply), we have 
difficulty developing a normative basis for judging the information con- 
tent of  the data from the studies. 
A Bayesian approach used by Meier (1975) and extended by others in 
considering the precision of historical controls might be helpful here. In 
spite of  a large sample size, historical control groups may give substan- 
tially varying performances depending on the physician or the institution 
where treatment is given. When we assign reliability to them as if  they 
came from an experiment with sample size n and standard deviation of 
measurement u, i.e., using u/fl,  we  overlook the group-to-group 
variability. By introducing this variability Meier is able to show how 
much the total variability increases. A difficulty with the approach is 
agreeing on the size of  the group-to-group variability to be introduced. 
That difficulty arises because (1) we have to define “groups like these,” 
and (2) we have to provide data for the groups, thus establishing a prior 
distribution for the situation at hand. The first of  these may not present 
much more difficulty than the usual fact that the scientists differ in how 
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and implies extensive information gathering and evaluation either in the 
field or from the literature. 
Currently  some  theoretical  work  has  been  going  on  in  statistics 
oriented toward using Bayes or empirical Bayes methods to evaluate the 
effects of  treatments in studies where the investigator has weak or no 
control over the allocation of  treatments to subjects or patients and 
where the choice of  allocation may itself be related to the probability of a 
favorable response from the treatment, over and above the value of the 
treatment itself (Rosenbaum 1980; Lax 1981). For example, more of the 
slightly ill patients may be allocated to treatment A and more of  the 
seriously ill to treatment B. These investigators are trying to provide ways 
of  untangling such effects. The investigators must, of  course, model the 
various components of  the problem. 
Since the efforts in this direction are fairly recent, two steps seem 
appropriate. One is to discover if these approaches can be applied to our 
problem. The other step is to attempt to find any circumstances where 
such efforts can be verified. So  far, although the methods have been 
applied, we have no verification. 
6.3.8  Predicting the Utilization of  Procedures 
By assessing numbers of patients with a specific disease and the rates at 
which the disease occurs and progresses, we can estimate the importance 
of a procedure and its value. We are, of course, concerned with the value 
of  the information leading to the establishment of  the importance or 
unimportance of  a therapy or procedure. 
The value of  one innovation depends on how soon another at least as 
good comes along and is adopted. If  we have both a new treatment and an 
old treatment, and the new treatment is better (PN  >  Po),  then the value 
of  an experiment to establish that fact depends on (1) the rate at which 
better treatments (P, >  PN)  come along to supplant the new, and (2) the 
rate at which treatments of intermediate efficacy (PN  >  PI >  Po) would 
have come along to supplant the old, prior to the introduction of  the 
better. The situation might develop as shown in figure 6.1, where the 
shaded area represents the benefit of  the trial. 
Of  course, if physicians are allowed to use the new treatment without a 
trial, then things get more complicated. We would hope that the more 
effective the new treatment, the more widely used it will be (as anecdotal 
evidence spreads and as a sort of “osmotic pressure” builds). Compared 
with the benefit of the experiment that would pertain under the assump- 
tion that the burden of proof falls on the innovation, the benefit will be 
less if PN >  Po; but it will be positive (and therefore greater) if PN  <  Po. 
Thinking about the course of diffusion over time raises another impor- 
tant question: At what point in time should a trial be conducted? If  we 
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Fig. 6.1  Assessing the potential benefit from a newly validated treat- 
ment . 
to change. But we also don’t want to do the trial too soon, because (a)  the 
technology may not be technically mature and may improve over time (in 
anticipation of which improvement, no one will pay attention to the trial 
if it shows no benefit), and (b)  the innovation may turn out to be a poor 
performer with bad side effects and sink into obscurity. We need to 
develop  strategies that adapt to early signals of  a procedure’s likely 
course and to respond promptly (but not prematurely) with a trial when 
appropriate. In other words, the decision whether to do a trial must be 
thought of  as dynamic, not static. 
6.3.9  Assessing Priors 
Gilbert, McPeek, and Mosteller (1977) took a small step in the direc- 
tion of assessing priors by reviewing randomized clinical trials in surgery 
over a ten-year period. They estimated the distribution of the size of the 
improvements (or losses), and they separated the experiments into two 
classes: those innovations intended to improve primary outcomes from 
surgery and anesthesia, and those intended to prevent or reduce com- 
plications following surgery and anesthesia. They found the average gain 
across studies to be about 0 percent improvement, the standard deviation 
for the gain in the primaries about 8 percent, and for the secondaries 
about 21 percent. 
Such empirical studies help us assess the prior probabilities of improve- 
ments of  various sizes brought by innovations. (This is a second-order 
value of  the information from a trial.) Many other research possibilities 
are available, from observational studies to estimate group variation, 
from discussions  with experts, and sometimes from reasonable considera- 
tions of  naturally occurring bounds. 
6.3.10  Costs and Risks of  Studies 
If  we already have an experimental design, we can probably evaluate 
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treatment, for example, should be allocated to the cost of  the investiga- 
tion, we should not have much difficulty evaluating the price of  a given 
trial. On the other hand, in certain cancer trials, the incremental cost may 
be small because the fixed cost of a multicenter “study group” has already 
been  paid.  It is  understood that  incremental  cost is the  appropriate 
measure. 
An exception would arise if  we had a wholly new therapy or if  the 
insurance system changed suddenly as it did during the swine-flu vaccina- 
tion program, but we would have to be careful to sort out real costs from 
transfer payments. 
The question of  risk is a thorny one that arises when human subjects 
are given a treatment less effective than the alternative (Weinstein 1974). 
For treatments with reasonably long horizons, this risk should be consid- 
ered minor compared to the long-term value of  knowing which is the 
better treatment. However, if  horizons are short, these problems may be 
more important. We may wish to consider alternative experimental de- 
signs that reduce the efficiency of  the study in order to reduce risks to 
subjects, e.g., play-the-winner rules and variable allocation formulae, 
(Zelen 1969; Cornfield, Halperin, and Greenhouse 1969). On balance, 
we do not want to be diverted too deeply into this thicket, since it is 
probably not productive. It would be better to concentrate on the pri- 
mary benefits and costs of  studies. 
6.3.11  Other Benefits of  Trials 
One of  the great values of  combining well-founded facts with good 
theory resides in the bounds that can be set. For example, with a little 
theory and a little empirical information, we can reassure ourselves that 
man need not look forward to running the two-minute mile unless a new 
method of  locomotion (or, should we say, ambulation) is discovered. 
Thus a study that gives us solid information about death rates, recovery 
times, and rates of  complications for a variety of  treatment groups is 
likely to provide  extra values that go beyond its own problem. The 
National Halothane Study, for example, not only studied the safety of 
anesthetics generally, but also provided data used to design other studies, 
stimulated the further Study of  Institutional Differences (in operative 
death rates), and acted as a proving ground for a variety of  statistical 
methods and encouraged  their further development.  How shall such 
information be evaluated? Can we assess a prior distribution for unantici- 
pated  benefits, without  necessarily being able to imagine what  those 
benefits might be? 
Another benefit of  clinical trials is that they may reinforce a general 
professional awareness of the value of scientific evidence of efficacy. The 
publication of  trials in key medical and specialty journals is thus seen as a 
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with respect to innovations, and setting high standards for the data base 
upon which  to support clinical decisions. Other benefits that may  be 
attributed to trials include enhancement of the quality of patient care for 
participants (although perhaps at some added cost), and insights leading 
to improved efficiency in administration of  health care services. 
6.4  Examples 
Earlier we  mentioned  the need  for a few examples that might be 
examined with a view towards helping us learn to evaluate the contribu- 
tion of  studies. 
6.4.1  Two Fables 
We begin with two fables because we need to be more realistic about 
some problems of evaluation. The examples draw on ideas in the history 
of  gastric freezing and blood pressure control. 
Gastric Freezing 
Gastric freezing was invented by  a famous surgeon, Owen Wangen- 
steen, to replace surgery as a treatment for gastric ulcers. The procedure 
was supported by biological theory: as a result of  cooling, the stomach 
would  have  a better chance to heal  itself. The patient  swallowed a 
balloon, and coolant from a special machine entered and was withdrawn 
from the balloon. 
A  sequence  of  observational  studies reported  the performance  of 
treated patients for the period  1962-69,  with percentage  of  relief  or 
definite improvement and sample size as shown in table 6.1. Although the 
outcomes in tables 6.1 vary a great deal, one notices decreasing perform- 
ance as follow-up time increases. 
Aside from these observational studies, several randomized double- 
blind trials were carried out comparing improvement following gastric- 
freezing treatment with that of controls. Table 6.2 shows the outcomes of 
these investigations. The study labeled “sham” at the bottom of the table 
was an especially well-controlled study that employed sham freezing as 
well as regular freezing. The sham and the freezing treatments produced 
nearly identical results. After this investigation, enthusiasm for the tech- 
nique waned  (Miao 1977). However, some studies of  gastric freezing 
(Fineberg  1976) suggest that  the treatment  was  falling into disfavor 
already and that the key experiment may have had only a slight effect. 
We can probably collect information on the manufacture and sale of 
gastric-freezing machines; we may not be able to discover actual numbers 
of treatments. Assuming that we can obtain year-by-year information for 
treatments, how shall it be used? 
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Table 6.1  Gastric Freezing Observational Studies 
Number 
Relieved  Treated and 
Follow-up Period  (%I  Observed 
Up to 6 weeks  100  19 
majority  86 
100  10 
6 weeks-8  months  72  150 
13”  13 
78  53 
65  33 
8 months-1.5  years  69  185 
14  29 
18  22 
21  60 
31  91 
1.5 years-3  years  no studies 
Over 3 years  20  85 
“A percentage of  13 is not compatible with n  = 13, but we are not able to recheck this. 
Table 6.2  Gastric Freezing Randomized Trials Together with Sample Sizes (n) 
Time of  Gastric Freezing  Control 
(months)  % Improved  n  % Improved  n 
FOIIOW-UP 
6  57  20  30  20 
75  19  29  17 
47  30  21  30 
18  76  28  46  24 
24  0  8  25  8 
24 (sham)  34  82  38  78 
treatment are positive, we have strong evidence of a gain. If, on the other 
hand, the benefits of treatment are zero or negative, we are released from 
further use of the treatment and can open our minds and resources more 
wholeheartedly to the use of  and search for other treatments. 
Hypertension 
The association between high blood pressure and cardiovascular mor- 
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ance industry,  for example,  published its so-called Build  and Blood 
Pressure Study in 1959. The Framingham Heart Study published its early 
follow-up results some time thereafter, and they were impressive. Mean- 
while, drugs that effectively lower blood pressure were generally avail- 
able, and their risks seemed small compared to the hypothesized benefits. 
And yet  no randomized  trial had proven the benefits of  high-blood- 
pressure control. The practice of  antihypertensive medication was lim- 
ited to cases of malignant hypertension, so-called because of its immedi- 
ate, dire consequences. 
Then in 1967, the first report of the Veterans Administration random- 
ized trial on antihypertensive medication was published (Veterans Ad- 
ministration Cooperative Study Group 1967). The trial established the 
efficacy of  treatment  in  “severe” hypertensives (those with  diastolic 
blood pressure or DBP above 115 mm  Hg). A later report, in  1970, 
established efficacy in “moderate” hypertensives (DBP between 105 and 
114 mm Hg) (Veterans Administration Cooperative Study Group 1970). 
The findings regarding mild hypertensives (DBP between 90 and 104 mm 
Hg) were inconclusive. Most of the hypertensives in the United States are 
mild hypertensives (perhaps 20 million of the 25 to 30 million hyperten- 
sives, the remainder being moderate or severe). 
Prescriptions for antihypertensive drugs increased following publica- 
tion of  the VA study, but not so rapidly as one might have hoped. By 
1973, it was estimated that perhaps 25 percent of  hypertensives were 
receiving medication (although only 15 percent were taking it); however, 
the  diffusion rate in  mild  hypertension  was  not  markedly less  than 
in moderate hypertension. The Secretary of  HEW, Elliot Richardson, 
launched the National High Blood Pressure Education Program to try to 
accelerate the practice of  treating high blood pressure.  This program 
apparently has been somewhat successful; at least, the proportion of 
hypertensives who are taking medication has been rising steadily. 
About the same time, interest arose in developing a controlled trial 
that would resolve the uncertainty about the efficacy of  treating mild 
hypertension.  This led to the Hypertension  Detection and Follow-up 
Program (HDFP), a community-based, randomized trial in which the 
controls, instead of receiving a placebo, were allowed to seek whatever 
treatment they wished. 
Many were skeptical whether the results of the HDFP would be useful. 
Therefore, plans were set for a true double-blind placebo trial in mild 
hypertension. However, estimates of the study size required to establish a 
statistically significant (a  = 0.05) effect with high power (1 -  p = 0.90) 
ranged from 36,000 to over 200,000, depending on assumptions about 
compliance, degree of blood pressure reduction, etc. (Laird, Weinstein, 
and Stason 1979).  The prior expectations were based on the Framingham 
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A calculation of the potential benefits and costs of such a trial was made 
at that time by one of  the authors and his colleagues (Laird, Weinstein, 
and Stason 1979). First, the cost of the trial was estimated at $135 million, 
assuming 28,000 subjects followed for five years. Next, the size of  the 
population at risk was estimated to be 20 million, of  which 10 percent 
were already being treated. Now, to simplify considerably, there were 
three possible results of  the trial: not efficacious, efficacious, and incon- 
clusive. If  it was found that treatment was not efficacious,  and if  this 
finding was translated into practice, then 2 million persons per year would 
not spend an average of $200 on treatment, for a total of  $400 million per 
year. Over ten years,  with  discounting  at 5  percent  per annum, the 
present value is $3 billion. 
Now  we need to assess some priors.  Let us say we assigned  a 0.1 
probability to the event that treatment is not effective and a 0.2 probabil- 
ity that the study will show conclusively the effect is either zero or small 
enough  to be considered  outweighed  by  risks  and  costs.  (The latter 
estimate can be made more rigorous by considering study size, a prior 
distribution of  the efficacy parameters, e.g., mortality rates, and the 
probability that each particular finding would result in reduced utiliza- 
tion.) Under these assumptions, the study has a 0.02 chance of saving $3 
billion over ten years, an expected value of  $60 million; so this contin- 
gency would pay back half the cost of  the study. Then we would have to 
repeat the analysis under the possibility that treatment is efficacious and 
that the study will so demonstrate. (Now we would have to estimate the 
health  benefits-as  Weinstein and Stason [1976] have done-and  the 
additional treatment costs owing to increased utilization.) We would also 
have to consider the false-negative case (treatment is efficacious, but the 
study says it is not), and the false-positive case (treatment is not effica- 
cious, but the study says it is). We would then plug  all this into the 
cost-effectiveness model and assess the value of  the study. 
The epilogue to this fable (although it is by no means over) is that the 
HDFP reported its results in  1979 (Hypertension  Detection  and Fol- 
low-up Program 1979). There was a significant and important treatment 
effect,  especially in the mildly hypertensive group. Now the controversy 
continues  around  whether  this  community-based  study  was  really 
measuring the effects of antihypertensive medication or whether other 
differences between the treatments could have accounted for the differ- 
ence in mortality. The value of  the HDFP-and  of the placebo trial that 
was never conducted-is  still not known. 
6.4.2  Examples with Other Complications 
sorts we note: 
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1. Studies of  coronary bypass surgery. Some coronary bypass surgery 
studies are experiments, and some are observational studies. Among 
other difficulties, they present the welcome problems of the improv- 
ing ability of  therapists, the reduction  of  costs as technology im- 
proves,  and thus possibly changing findings over time.  Although 
much can be made of these matters, they are a commonplace of the 
passage of time and improvements in science and technology. Evalu- 
ators should  have  ways  of  dealing with  them. In this  sense  any 
therapy is always in an experimental or dynamic state. 
2.  Prostate cancer. A large-scale study of prostate cancer led to dosage 
and therapeutic recommendations (Byar 1973). As far as we know, 
the study is not now the subject of  controversy, although it was 
attacked for some time. 
3. Portocaval shunt. Many portocaval-shunt  studies with varying de- 
grees of  control show that the weaker the control, the more favorable 
the outcome of the investigation to the treatment. These studies, and 
many like them for other diseases collected by Chalmers and his 
colleagues, go a long way towards undermining the informational 
content of poorly controlled studies (Grace, Muench, and Chalmers 
1966). 
4. University Group Diabetes Project  (UGDP). This diabetes study 
illustrates many difficulties that arise in practice from optional stop- 
ping, from hypotheses generated during the experiments, from data 
deemed to be important though not collected, and from results that 
are unpopular with physicians and commercial institutions. 
5. Salk vaccine trial. This trial went well. 
6. Gamma globulin study. This gamma globulin study, weakly con- 
trolled, was intended to prove the medication effective against polio. 
At the close of  the study little was known. 
Although we could lengthen this list, we need to discuss what consid- 
erations should go into the choices for detailed study: Can we define a 
population of  studies? Should we study both RCT’s and observational 
studies? Can we measure the follow-up effects of the studies? How? 
6.5  Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to outline a general program of research 
and the reasons for it. We will benefit from criticism and discussion, 
recognizing that the total problem is a bit like dipping one’s head into a 
bowl of  fruit salad and opening one’s eyes. 
Are there parts of the research program that can profitably be broken 
off and studied separately? The approach described has a rather worm’s 
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an estimate of, everything before we can reach conclusions. Are more 
global, decentralized attacks possible? Meanwhile, three observations 
seem likely to stand up to further scrutiny: 
In planning a controlled trial, it wouldbe valuable for those expert in 
effectiveness, costs, and other data pertinent to the health area of the 
trial, to perform at least a rough, back-of-the-envelope calculation of 
potential benefits and cost savings. This sort of meta-analysis cannot 
hurt, and even if  we don’t yet know how to implement a full-blown 
planning model of  the type we have outlined, the rough calculations 
may help. 
Evidence of efficacy from controlled trials will not solve the health- 
care-cost  problem  and will  not even  eliminate  uncertainty  from 
medical decisions. Value judgments related to multi-attributed out- 
comes (including quality of life) will remain, as will uncertainties at 
the  level of  the individual patient. Moreover, the problems of what to 
do about procedures that offer diminishing (but positive) benefits at 
increasing costs will always be with us. 
Clinical trials can help, and we need to learn their value and how to 
increase it. As a nation, we may try various institutional changes to 
encourage the use by practitioners of  trial information, perhaps by 
linking reimbursement to demonstrated efficacy, but more likely by 
providing  incentives  to  be  both  efficacy-conscious  and  cost- 
conscious. 
Comment  Joseph B. Kadane 
Any governmental activity on which millions of  dollars are spent is a 
worthy subject of analysis. Medical experimentation is a good candidate 
for such analysis, not only because of the amount of money involved, but 
also because we are all prospective beneficiaries of the improvements in 
medical techniques made possible by such experimentation. 
In this very interesting paper, Mosteller and Weinstein give us an initial 
model to guide the choice of which medical experiments to support. The 
heart of that model is in section 6.2.4 of their paper. Some of their twelve 
assumptions are heroic, particularly the ninth assumption that all medical 
decision-makers will instantly adopt a new procedure if  it is shown in the 
experiment to be cost-effective. The authors recognize in section 6.3.1 
the desirability of  substituting for this normative model a descriptive 
model of  the spread of medical innovation. But they also point out how 
little we know about the history and sociology of medical innovation. Yet 
we need good descriptive models of this process to predict what would 
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happen in medical decision-making if  the experiment were conducted 
and had various specified outcomes, and what would happen absent the 
experiment. 
Certainly Mosteller and Weinstein are correct to call for rough, back- 
of-the-envelope calculation of  the potential benefits and cost savings of 
each planned controlled medical trial. I do not understand quite so well, 
however, what research strategy they would use to make such calcula- 
tions better informed. What would their research priorities be? Without 
this information, even a rough calculation of benefits and costs for their 
own research proposal seems impossible. 
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